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The criminals are sophisticated. The emails are convincing. The pressure is real. And once the money is gone, it's almost never recovered.
TL;DR: Wire fraud in real estate costs buyers an average of $150,000 per incident, and Eastern Kentucky families are prime targets. Criminals impersonate title companies through sophisticated phishing emails, steal closing funds with fake wire instructions, and disappear before victims realize they’ve been scammed. Eastern KY Title prevents wire fraud through encrypted portals, verbal verification protocols, and treating your money like our own family’s retirement fund.
You’re three hours away from closing on your dream home. Your phone buzzes with an email from your title company. The subject line reads: “URGENT – Updated Wire Instructions for Today’s Closing.”
The email looks perfect. Same logo. Same email signature. Same professional tone you’ve seen in every other communication. The message explains that due to a “last-minute banking change,” you need to wire your $42,000 down payment to a different account. The new instructions are attached. Time is critical—the closing can’t proceed without immediate payment.
You read the email twice. Something feels slightly off, but you can’t quite identify what. The pressure is mounting. Your real estate agent is calling. The moving truck is scheduled. Your family is counting on you.
So you wire the money.
And in that moment, your life savings disappears into a criminal network that spans continents. The real title company never sent that email. The bank account belongs to a fraud ring operating out of Eastern Europe or West Africa. By the time you arrive at the actual closing and discover the truth, your $42,000 is gone forever—transferred, withdrawn, and laundered through a dozen accounts across multiple countries.
This isn’t a plot from a crime thriller. This is happening right now, every single day, to buyers across America—including families right here in Eastern Kentucky, from Coal Run to Ivel, Pikeville to Prestonsburg.
After years of legal practice including service as a Kentucky Assistant Attorney General, I’ve seen financial crimes from every angle. But wire fraud in real estate transactions is particularly devastating because it targets people at their most vulnerable moment—when they’re excited, stressed, and focused on one of the biggest financial decisions of their lives.
The criminals are sophisticated. The emails are convincing. The pressure is real. And once the money is gone, it’s almost never recovered.

Wire fraud is a scheme where criminals intercept or impersonate legitimate communications in a real estate transaction to steal funds through fraudulent wire transfers. The most common method is business email compromise (BEC), where hackers infiltrate email systems, monitor conversations, and insert themselves at the perfect moment with fake wire instructions.
According to the FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center, real estate-related fraud losses reached $145 million in 2023, while broader Business Email Compromise (BEC) schemes—which often target closings—cost victims $2.9 billion. Industry reports indicate the median loss for real estate wire fraud victims is over $70,000—often representing someone’s entire life savings.
These numbers are growing exponentially because:
Twenty years ago, most real estate funds were transferred via cashier’s check at in-person closings. Today, wire transfers are the norm—fast, convenient, and completely irreversible once executed.
Most people and many businesses use email systems with minimal security. Passwords are weak, two-factor authentication isn’t enabled, and phishing emails successfully trick even tech-savvy users.
Modern fraud rings employ professional hackers, graphic designers, and social engineers. Their fake emails are nearly impossible to distinguish from legitimate communications. They monitor email chains for weeks, learning the language, timing, and patterns before striking.
Wire transfers are processed within minutes. By the time victims realize they’ve been scammed—often at the closing table when the title company says they never received the funds—the money has already been moved through multiple accounts and withdrawn.
Unlike credit card fraud where you can dispute charges, wire transfers are final. Once the money leaves your account, getting it back requires international cooperation, law enforcement involvement, and usually results in recovering little or nothing.
Eastern Kentucky families are particularly vulnerable because we tend to trust people, we’re not always familiar with sophisticated cybersecurity threats, and many of us are first-time homebuyers navigating unfamiliar territory.
That combination of trust, unfamiliarity, and high-value transactions makes us perfect targets.

Let me walk you through three situations that illustrate how quickly money can disappear when proper safeguards aren’t in place.
A couple in Floyd County was purchasing their first home—a beautiful property they’d been saving for since they got married five years earlier. They’d scraped together $40,000 for the down payment, representing every dollar they could spare from two modest incomes and a lot of sacrifice.
Five days before closing, they received an email from their title company. Or at least, that’s what it looked like.
The email used the title company’s logo, had a professional signature block with contact information, and referenced their specific property address and closing date. The message explained that due to “recent banking regulation changes,” wire instructions needed to be sent through a “secure portal” rather than standard email.
The email included a link to what appeared to be the title company’s secure document portal. The couple clicked the link, which took them to a professional-looking website that asked them to verify their identity and review the updated wire instructions.
Here’s what was actually happening: criminals had hacked the title company’s email system weeks earlier and had been monitoring communications. They created a fake website that mimicked the title company’s portal. They crafted an email that matched the title company’s style perfectly. And they timed their attack for exactly the right moment—close enough to closing that urgency felt reasonable, but early enough that the couple wouldn’t immediately verify with the real title company.
Fortunately, this story has a better ending than most. The wife, who worked in banking, noticed something subtle that bothered her: the email address was off by a single character. The attackers had registered a look-alike domain that added just one extra letter to the end of the title company’s name—an imperceptible difference unless you looked closely.
She called the title company directly using the phone number from their original engagement letter (not the number in the suspicious email). Within minutes, they confirmed that no such email had been sent and that the couple had nearly fallen victim to a sophisticated phishing attack.
The FBI was notified. The fake website was taken down. But countless other buyers across the country weren’t as observant or as lucky.
The criminals had done their homework. They knew the property address. They knew the closing date. They knew the approximate down payment amount. They’d monitored weeks of legitimate email communications to perfect their impersonation.
One tiny typo in a domain name—one character—was the only clue that this was fraud.
This scenario doesn’t involve criminal activity, but it demonstrates what happens when money isn’t managed properly.
A buyer in Pike County purchased a home with an FHA loan requiring an escrow account for property taxes and homeowner’s insurance. The title company—a large national operation based in another state—collected the escrow funds at closing and was supposed to ensure property taxes were paid on time.
Six months after closing, the new homeowner received a penalty notice from the Pike County Sheriff’s office. Property taxes were delinquent. Penalties and interest had accrued. The homeowner’s credit was about to be negatively affected.
The homeowner was furious and confused. “I paid into escrow every month with my mortgage payment. How could this happen?”
Investigation revealed that the title company had miscalculated the escrow requirements at closing, collecting insufficient funds to cover the tax bill. When the taxes came due, the escrow account was short by $847. Rather than notifying the homeowner and requesting additional funds, the title company simply… didn’t pay the taxes.
The homeowner discovered the problem only when the county sent a penalty notice—after interest and fees had already accumulated.
Fixing this mess required:
The title company eventually reimbursed the penalties, but only after weeks of pressure and formal complaints. The homeowner’s stress, time, and energy were never compensated.
This is what happens when escrow accounts are managed carelessly by companies that treat them as routine bookkeeping rather than serious fiduciary responsibilities.
As John puts it, “Escrow accounts aren’t complicated math—they’re trust in dollar form. When someone mishandles escrow, they’re breaking a promise to protect what matters most.”
Escrow accounts aren’t complicated math—they’re trust in dollar form. When someone mishandles escrow, they’re breaking a promise to protect what matters most.
John Holder
A buyer in Johnson County was purchasing a property on a Friday afternoon. The closing was scheduled for 2 PM, with funds to be wired from the buyer’s bank to the title company’s trust account.
The title company—an out-of-state operation handling the transaction remotely—provided wire instructions and confirmed that as long as the wire was initiated before 5 PM, everything would be fine for closing.
The buyer’s local Kentucky bank initiated the wire transfer at 3:15 PM on Friday. The bank confirmed the transfer was sent. The buyer went to closing confident that everything was handled.
But the funds never arrived.
The title company’s bank—a large national bank in another time zone—had a wire cutoff time of 2 PM Eastern for same-day processing. The transfer initiated at 3:15 PM wouldn’t be processed until Monday morning.
The closing couldn’t proceed without funds. The seller was furious. The real estate agents were scrambling. The buyer was humiliated and confused—their bank said the money was sent, but the title company said it never arrived.
The transaction was delayed until Monday afternoon, after the funds finally cleared. The seller charged a per diem fee for the delay. The buyer’s moving truck had to be rescheduled at additional cost. Everyone involved was frustrated and stressed.
This entire disaster could have been prevented if the title company had understood local Kentucky banking practices and communicated proper cutoff times based on the buyer’s actual bank location—not their own institutional practices.
When you work with a local title company that knows Kentucky banks, their hours, their wire processing times, and their specific procedures, these “stuck funds” situations don’t happen.
Understanding how criminals execute wire fraud helps you recognize and avoid it. Here’s the typical sequence:
Step 1: Target Identification
Criminals identify upcoming real estate transactions by:
Step 2: Surveillance
Once they’ve identified a target transaction, criminals monitor email communications for weeks, learning:
Step 3: Infrastructure Setup
Criminals create fake infrastructure that mimics legitimate businesses:
Step 4: The Attack
At the optimal moment—usually 24-72 hours before closing when urgency is high and verification is less likely—criminals send fake wire instructions that appear to come from the title company, real estate agent, or attorney.
These emails typically:
Step 5: Extraction
Once the victim wires funds to the fraudulent account, the money is immediately:
This entire process—from receiving fraudulent instructions to complete loss of funds—can happen in under an hour.
Step 6: Discovery and Aftermath
Victims usually discover the fraud when they arrive at the actual closing and the real title company says funds were never received. By this point:
Recovery rates for wire fraud are abysmal—the FBI reports that only about 15% of victims recover any money, and those who do typically recover only a fraction of what was stolen.
Criminals are sophisticated, but they’re not perfect. Here are the warning signs that should trigger immediate verification:
If you see ANY of these red flags, stop immediately and verify through a different communication channel before taking any action.
We treat your closing funds the way we’d treat our own family’s retirement savings—with absolute paranoia about security and zero tolerance for risk.
Our multi-layered wire fraud prevention system includes:
We use secure, encrypted portals for transmitting sensitive financial information. Wire instructions are never sent via standard email. Clients receive access to our secure portal where documents and wire instructions are posted with multi-factor authentication required for access.
This eliminates the most common attack vector: email compromise.
Before any wire transfer is executed, we require verbal confirmation through a phone call to a number the client has independently verified (not a number provided in any email communication).
During this call, we:
This simple step—requiring a phone conversation—stops the vast majority of wire fraud attempts because criminals can’t intercept phone calls to numbers clients obtain independently.
Wire instructions are provided in writing well in advance of closing—typically 5-7 business days before the transaction. This gives clients time to review, ask questions, and verify accuracy without the pressure of last-minute urgency.
If any changes to wire instructions become necessary (rare, but occasionally required due to legitimate banking issues), we:
Our trust accounts—where client funds are held—are maintained with banks we’ve worked with for years, subject to regular audits, and monitored daily for any unusual activity.
We never:
We proactively educate every client about wire fraud risks before they’re in a position to be victimized. This includes:
Our title insurance policies through Stewart Title include cyber fraud coverage. Additionally, we maintain errors and omissions insurance and fiduciary bonds that protect clients even in worst-case scenarios.
If funds are somehow misdirected due to our error (never happened, but we’re prepared), clients are protected by multiple layers of insurance coverage.
We work with Kentucky banks we know personally. We understand their wire processing times, their security procedures, and their specific requirements. This prevents the “stuck funds over the weekend” scenario and ensures same-day processing when needed.
When you wire funds to Eastern KY Title, we’re coordinating with banks where we know the branch managers, not institutions where we’re just another account number.
Here’s exactly what you should do to protect yourself from wire fraud:
Time is critical if fraud occurs—the faster you act, the better chance (however small) of recovering funds.
If you discover you’ve wired money to a fraudulent account, take these immediate actions:
1. Contact your bank immediately (within minutes if possible)
Ask them to:
Time is absolutely critical—minutes matter. Most fraudulent accounts are emptied within hours of receiving funds.
2. Contact the receiving bank
If your bank provides the name and location of the receiving bank, call them directly and report the fraudulent wire transfer. Ask them to freeze the account and hold the funds.
3. File a complaint with the FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3)
Visit www.ic3.gov and file a detailed complaint including:
4. Contact local law enforcement
File a report with your county sheriff’s office or Kentucky State Police. While they may have limited ability to investigate international wire fraud, the police report creates official documentation.
5. Notify your title company
Tell your actual title company what happened. They may:
6. Consult an attorney
You may have legal claims against various parties depending on the circumstances. An attorney can evaluate:
7. Notify credit bureaus
If you suspect your personal information was compromised as part of the fraud, place fraud alerts with all three credit bureaus and monitor your credit reports.
Reality Check: Despite all these steps, recovery is unlikely. FBI data shows that only about 15% of wire fraud victims recover any money, and recovered amounts are typically far less than total losses.
Prevention is everything. Once the money is gone, it’s almost certainly gone forever.
While wire fraud gets the headlines, mismanaged escrow accounts cause serious problems too. Here’s what to watch for:
Your title company can’t clearly explain escrow procedures.
If you ask how escrow funds will be managed and receive vague or confusing answers, that’s a warning sign.
Escrow calculations seem incorrect.
Property taxes in Eastern Kentucky vary significantly by county. Your title company should use actual tax amounts from the PVA office, not generic estimates.
You’re not receiving regular escrow statements.
Properly managed escrow accounts generate regular statements showing deposits, payments, and current balances.
Tax or insurance payments are late.
If you receive delinquency notices from the county or your insurance company when you’ve been paying into escrow, something is wrong.
Your title company is slow to respond to escrow questions.
Competent title companies can immediately pull up escrow account details and explain any transaction. Delays suggest disorganization or worse.
Escrow shortages appear without explanation.
If you’re suddenly told your escrow is short and you need to pay additional funds, demand a detailed accounting of where the shortage came from.
Trust your instincts. If something feels wrong with how your escrow account is being managed, demand answers and documentation.
When you’re wiring $50,000, $100,000, or more, you want to know exactly who’s handling that money and how to reach them if something goes wrong.
National title companies processing transactions from call centers in other states can’t provide the same level of security and accountability that local companies offer:
If you have questions about wire instructions at 4 PM on a Friday, you call our local number and talk to someone who knows your transaction—not a customer service representative reading from a script.
Our reputation matters. We live here, work here, and see clients at the grocery store. We can’t hide behind corporate anonymity if something goes wrong.
We know Kentucky banks, their wire processing times, their security protocols, and their specific requirements. We coordinate directly with local institutions.
If you want to meet in person to review wire instructions or discuss security concerns, we make that happen. We’re not three states away.
Stewart Title provides the financial backing, insurance coverage, and national resources of a major underwriter, combined with our local expertise and accountability.
That combination—local service with institutional backing—provides the security that your money deserves.
I’ve seen enough financial crimes—from my time as a Kentucky Assistant Attorney General to years of private practice—to know that criminals are sophisticated, relentless, and constantly adapting.
Wire fraud in real estate is growing because it works. Criminals are stealing hundreds of millions of dollars annually because even careful, intelligent people fall victim to well-crafted schemes.
The solution isn’t hoping it won’t happen to you. The solution is working with professionals who treat wire fraud prevention as seriously as you treat your hard-earned money.
We’re paranoid about security because paranoia is appropriate. We require verification because trust isn’t enough. We use encrypted communication because standard email is vulnerable. We call you to confirm wire instructions because phone calls can’t be intercepted the way emails can.
Some might say we’re overly cautious. We say we’re appropriately protective of what matters most.
When you close with Eastern KY Title, your money is protected by multiple layers of security, backed by Stewart Title’s resources, and handled by attorneys who understand both the legal and the practical aspects of fraud prevention.
We treat your closing funds like our own family’s retirement savings—because that’s exactly what they represent for you.
Lindon Gullett, Attorney at Law (Licensed in Kentucky), is President & Real Estate Attorney at Eastern KY Title. His career includes service as a Kentucky Assistant Attorney General, Staff Attorney with the Department of Public Advocacy, and years of hands-on legal practice across civil, criminal, and administrative matters. Lindon’s government and courtroom experience gives him exceptional skill at analyzing legal documents, clearing title defects, and protecting clients throughout transactions. Clients value his professionalism, reliability, and commitment to delivering smooth, secure closings.
Professional Licensure & Credentials:
Don’t risk your life savings to wire fraud or mismanaged escrow accounts. Choose a title company that treats your money with the paranoid protection it deserves.
Call us today at (606) 226-0024 or email info@easternkytitle.com to discuss your transaction security. We serve all of Eastern Kentucky with encrypted communication, verbal verification protocols, and the local accountability that keeps your money safe.
Because we treat your closing funds like our own family’s retirement—with zero tolerance for risk.
Best regards,
Eastern KY Title Team
FULL DISCLOSURE: We use AI to draft our blog content because, frankly, we’d rather spend our time closing deals and helping Kentucky realtors than staring at blank screens. But don’t worry, we’re not letting the robots run wild. John and Lindon edit every single post to make sure it’s factually accurate, Kentucky-specific, and doesn’t sound like it was written by someone who thinks Appalachia is a type of pasta. If the AI writes something dumb, we fix it. If you spot something we missed, call us out. We’re good for it.